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1 Introduction
Product bundling consists of selling two or more products in a package, or bundle.
Initially, commodity bundling, like other forms of tying, has been mainly viewed
as a price discrimination tool used by a monopolist to extract a larger portion of
the consumer surplus, as pointed out by Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976),
Schmalensee (1982 and 1984), McAfee et al. (1989) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson
(1999), inter alii. When consumers have different tastes for several products, a
monopolist may bundle to reduce such heterogeneity in valuations, thus earning a
higher profit. This is particularly evident when the bundled goods have a negative
correlation in value.
More recently, the focus has shifted to the study of multi-product firms that
enjoy monopoly power only in their primary market, while still facing competition
in a secondary one. It is usually analyzed the simple case where firm 1 is the sole
producer of good A, while good B is produced by both firm 1 and firm 2. Under
this very simple framework, two rich but different streams of literature emerged: one
studying bundling as a powerful entry-deterrence device, the other stressing on the
strategic incentives to bundle in oligopoly models.
On the one hand, the entry-deterrence effect of bundling relies on the so-called
leverage theory. As initially demonstrated byWhinston (1990), a firm with monopoly
power in one market can use the leverage provided by that market to foreclose the
access of a rival in a second market. He specifically refers to the role of tying as a
credible commitment against the potential entry of a rival in one sector and such
strategy is profitable only if it succeeds. The entry-deterrence use of bundling com-
plement goods has been further investigated by Choi and Stefanadis (2001) and
Carlton and Waldman (2002). Nalebuff (2004) considers a multiproduct firm with
market power in two goods and demonstrates that bundling is not only a credible
tool to protect both markets from entry, but it also reduces the profit loss if en-
try occurs, or if there is already an existing one-product rival. Similar results are
obtained by Choi (2004), who builds a deterministic R&D model with horizontal
product differentiation to analyze the effects of bundling on R&D incentives. He
finds that bundling can be beneficial even when it does not force the exit of the
rival.
On the other hand, the strategic effect of bundling has been initially examined
in the contributions of Carbajo et al. (1990) and Martin (1999). The bottom
line is that bundling can be used by the multi-product firm to increase product
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differentiation and/or change the substitution relationship between goods A and B.
In particular, Carbajo et al. (1990) showcase the product differentiation effect in a
model with homogeneous goods in market B and valuations for goods A and B that
are perfectly correlated and uniformly distributed across consumers. They evaluate
the profitability of bundling both under Bertrand and Cournot competition. When
firms compete in prices bundling softens market competition and both firms gain
from such decision; when they compete in quantities, on the contrary, the bundling
firm is the only one that gains. Martin (1999) uses a simple model of consumer
behavior and derives demand curves when bundling occurs; he shows the change in
substitution relationships between the goods among which consumers choose brought
by bundling. His methodology can be applied only to a Cournot setting, where he
demonstrates that the multi-product firm has always a strategic incentive to bundle
as this operation increases its profits while reducing that of the rival.
An alternative approach in which bundling is used as a device to segment the
market and relax price competition can be found in Chen (1997), who models the
choice of bundling by two rival firms competing in the same markets. In particular,
the two firms already produce a homogeneous good and have to decide whether to in-
troduce a second good bundled with the former. He shows that bundling emerges as
an equilibrium strategy for both firms given that it increases product differentiation.
Gans and King (2006) model the interaction between four producers of two products
to investigate the consequences of bundled discount to encourage customer loyalty.
They found that, even for unrelated products, a bundled discount has the effect of
tying customers to particular product brands, thus improving the profitability of the
firms involved.
Another related field of study focuses its attention on the combination of com-
plementary components into composite systems. Matutes and Regibeau (1988 and
1992) and Economides (1989) consider fully integrated firms and show that they
prefer compatibility over incompatibility. Farrell, Monroe and Saloner (1998), on
the contrary, demonstrate that firms may prefer incompatibility with cost hetero-
geneity in presence of at least three different varieties of each component. Denicolò
(2000) analyzes compatibility and bundling choices when one generalist firm offers
both components of a system and competes against two specialist firms each sup-
plying only one component. He shows that incompatibility or pure bundling may
be profitable for the generalist firm when one component is less differentiated than
the other. Furthermore, in his model one of the specialist firm may lose when the
generalist opts for bundling.
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A very interesting question is whether bundling should or should not be allowed
by the antitrust authority. Notwithstanding its potential anti-competitive effect,
most of the aforementioned literature paid relatively scarce attention to the welfare
implications of bundling.1 Relevant exceptions are Chen (1997) and Martin (1999),
who demonstrate the negative impact of bundling on overall social welfare. A con-
tribution with a direct reference on antitrust decisions is the one by Choi (2008),
who examines mergers in complementary system markets where the merging parties
may engage in bundling.2 He shows that bundling may have both pro-competitive
and anti-competitive effects; in case of any foreclosure of rivals, however, bundling
reduces unambiguously social welfare and the merger should be prohibited.
The aim of my paper is to shed light on a partially neglected aspect of bundling.
First, I want to demonstrate that the strategic effect of bundling applies also to
the case of a multi-product firm which produces complement goods and competes
with single-product rivals, each producing a horizontally differentiated versions of
its products. Second, I want to investigate the consequences of bundling for social
welfare, and draw policy implications. In particular, differently from previous con-
tributions, I want to study whether the multiproduct firm may have an incentive to
offer pure bundles at prices which are not lower than the sum of the prices of the
two individual goods. This could be of great interest for the antitrust agency.
In order to accomplish my goal, I consider a situation in which there are three
firms and two complement goods, A and B. Firm 1 produces both goods, while
firms 2 and 3 respectively produce a horizontally differentiated version of good A
and one of good B. Previous contributions did not distinguish between two different
versions of the same type of good produced by two rival firms. The only exception
is represented by Denicolò (2000), who considers an integrated firm which produces
two components of a system and two rival firms, each providing a horizontally dif-
ferentiated version of the two components. However, his focus is on compatibility
rather than bundling, given that the two goods have to be combined together for
the system to make sense. Moreover, in his model each consumer buys at most
1The Chicago School since Bowman (1957) and Posner (1976) harshly criticized any form of
leverage theory, and this explains why price discrimination has been the initial focus of the economic
literature on bundling. In the European competition policy, on the contrary, bundling has gained
enormous prominence in a number of recent cases, e.g. GE/Honeywell, Tetra Laval/Sidel and the
recent Microsoft case in which the European Commission ordered the unbundling of the Windows
Media Player from Windows.
2 In particular, he considers the decision of the European Commission to block on July 3, 2001,
the proposed merger between General Electric and Honeywell on the basis of the possibility of
bundling between GE’s jet aircraft engines and Honeywell’s avionics products.
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one system. On the contrary, I will try to keep things even more general, assuming
that: (i) goods A and B are valuable in the eyes of a customer even if consumed
independently, (ii) the combination A − B produced by firm 1 is not superior to
that provided separately by firms 2 and 3.3 Apart from the asymmetry regarding
the number of goods produced by firm 1, there are no additional factors which could
artificially create an incentive to bundle. The theoretical model that I will adopt
may give rise to some algebraic complications and I will therefore limit my analysis
to the case of pure bundling. Nonetheless, this will be sufficient to pinpoint the
rationale behind the incentive to bundle.
Many real-life examples motivate my approach, especially in sectors like cloth-
ing, food, leisure time and entertainment. Starbucks sells coffee and cookies, but
different versions of these goods can be separately purchased in a Illy coffee shop and
at Aunt Annies’s. The main production lines of Victoria’s Secret are lingerie and
body products; in alternative, consumers can buy different types of body products
from Elisabeth Arden and of lingerie by Frederick’s of Hollywood. Internet-based
travel reservation websites, like Expedia or eDreams, offer vacation packages includ-
ing travel and accommodation, but it is possible to book the flight directly from
the company’s webpage and look for accommodation in Booking.com, for example.
Comcast provides both cable TV and Internet connection, whereas Dishnetwork is
specialized in digital satellite television and Pacific Bell in Internet services. These
are all examples of complement goods which can be consumed together, or sepa-
rately, and they do not need to be purchased in pair to be of any value. Moreover,
one can opt for a good produced by one brand complemented with a good produced
by an alternative brand: no combination is a priori better than the other. Finally,
they have been seasonally offered in bundles. An investigation of the potential con-
sequences for consumers and social welfare would then be appropriate.
The starting point of my paper is a generalization of the model by Martin (1999).
The aim is to demonstrate that a standard model of consumer behavior does not
allow to capture the strategic effect of bundling when one introduces competition
on both markets served by the multi-product firm. Moreover, Martin does not dis-
tinguish between different versions of the same product, thus limiting the possibility
to extend his analysis into the directions that I want to explore. Martin’s model-
ing strategy is nonetheless very useful as I will adopt a similar methodology when
3This is justified by the fact that recent decisions taken by the Antitrust agencies impeded the
producer to bundle two complements that are mutually dependent. This is particularly true in
hi-tech sectors, such as computers (see the Microsof case).
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rewriting the welfare function in terms of bundles.
In order to pursue the scope of my research I will have to consider a specific
social welfare function that accounts for the presence of four goods in the market
and derive the demand functions for both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Then
I will compute the equilibrium profits for the three firms in the two alternative
scenarios, depending on the decision of the multi-product firm to bundle its products
or not; such decision is taken before prices or outputs are chosen. As there are no
additional assumptions regarding both consumer preferences and the structure of
the firms, whenever the firm will decide to bundle, it will act only on the basis of
strategic considerations.
The main results of my analysis can be summarized as follows. First, when
firms compete à la Cournot, the multiproduct firm does not earn additional profit
by bundling. I will demonstrate that the optimal bundle consists in one unit of
both products, and this helps explaining the lack of incentive to sell both goods in
a package: the demand structure adopted allows the consumer to decide upon any
amount of the four goods, and a 1−1 bundle is ineffective when firms set quantities.
The outcome will be different under Bertrand competition, even when considering
bundling on a 1−1 ratio. When firms set prices, bundling is profitable for relatively
high values of product substitutability between the different versions of goods A
and B combined with relatively low values of product complementarity between
any A and B. This is due to the fact that the negative effect on the profit of the
multi-product firm induced by (i) a lower degree of product differentiation between
its varieties and the one produced by the rivals and/or (ii) a decrease in product
complementarity is dampened by selling the two goods together.
Bundling acts therefore not only as a product-differentiation device, as in pre-
vious contributions, but also as a way to oblige consumers to buy both goods even
when the perceived degree of complementarity is low. In my model bundling results
from an accurate evaluation of the substitutability/complementarity relationships
which affect the strategy of a multi-product firm which competes with alternative
producers in each segment of its product line.
When bundling occurs, market competition is weaker and all firms can charge
higher prices.4 However, the rivals of the multi-product firm do not always gain when
bundling occurs. In particular, they incur a profit loss when product substitutability
4Based on this result, my paper contributes to the literature on ‘Co-opetition’, initially developed
by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996). In a recent paper, Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2008) con-
tribute to this literature by presenting Intel and Microsoft as a motivating example on the tension
between cooperation and competition that characterizes relationships between complementors.
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is not sufficiently high (and/or, product complementarity is not sufficiently low),
due to a reduction in the output level that is not compensated by the higher prices
charged under bundling.
Another interesting result is that the multi-product firm sells the bundle at a
price which is higher than the sum of the prices it charged for the individual goods.
In the literature, a form of bundling in which the bundle price is higher than the sum
of separate prices is known as ‘premium bundling’ (since Cready, 1991) and quotes
as examples the collection sets, where the complete set is usually more expensive
than the sum of individual components of the set. However, the explanation for
such pricing policy relies on the lack of information of customers, which are not well
informed about a product, or do not want to waste time in looking for the individual
components and put them together.5 In my paper, on the contrary, the higher prices
are due to pure strategic reasons.
Finally, I will evaluate the effects on social welfare of the decision to bundle by
the multi-product firm. As prices rise and overall quantity shrinks, it will be imme-
diate to conclude that consumer surplus is lower under bundling, thus justifying the
intervention of a regulator particularly concerned at consumer protection. Taking
into account also producer surplus, the main policy implication does not change, as
it will be possible to demonstrate that the loss in consumer surplus is higher than
the gain for firms. This reinforces the need for the competent authority to intervene
and prohibit the bundling activity.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 proposes an extended version of
Martin (1999) with two firms in each sector. Section 3 presents the demand structure
that will be used in this paper. Section 4 proposes the Cournot case while Section
5 the Bertrand case and the welfare implications of bundling. Section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminaries
In this preliminary section I consider the model by Martin (1999), where the multi-
product firm has a monopoly power in the production of good A whereas it competes
with a rival in the production of good B. As introduced before, one of the main
results of his paper is to show that bundling has a strategic effect because it alters
substitutability relationships. The multi-product firm always gains from bundling,
5 In the article "The Pros and Cons of Bundling", recently appeared in the The Harvard Business
Review (February 26, 2010), Anthony Tjan writes that bundling often implies a lack of transparency
for consumers. In particular, he argues that sellers can group products and services together in such
a way to hides how much the customer would pay for each individual item.
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while the rival incurs in a profit loss. Net welfare unambiguously shrinks with
bundling, thus calling for antitrust intervention.
I extend Martin’s model to account for the presence of a third firm, which pro-
duces good A. The social welfare function is the one originally adopted by Spence
(1976) and Dixit (1979):
U = m+ a(QA +QB)− 1
2
(Q2A + 2θQAQB +Q
2
B), (1)
where m is the amount of the numeraire good, whose price is normalized to one,
and parameter θ captures the degree of substitutability/complementarity between
goods A and B. When θ ∈ (−1, 0), the two goods are complements, while when
θ ∈ (0, 1) the two goods are substitutes. For θ = 0 the two goods are independent in
demand, while for θ = 1 (resp. θ = −1) the two goods are perfect substitutes (resp.
complements).
Inverse demand functions for the two goods are:
pA = a−QA − θQB, (2)
pB = a−QB − θQA. (3)
One of the crucial point of Martin’s analysis is that QA and QB represent the
total quantities respectively produced of good A and good B. In particular, he
assumed that QA is supplied only by the multi-product firm 1 ( QA = qA1), while
QB is supplied by both firms 1 and 2 (QB = qB1+qB2). The extension that I initially
propose consists in introducing firm 3 that produces good A, hence:
QA = qA1 + qA3 , (4)
QB = qB1 + qB2 . (5)
It is worth noting that the above writing implies that the two varieties of each good
are homogeneous, while in the model that I will propose in the next section firms 2
and 3 will respectively produce a horizontally differentiated version of good A and
of good B.
In order to minimize initial asymmetries among firms, the marginal cost of pro-
ducing goods A and B is assumed to be symmetric across firms and equal to c. In
absence of bundling, the profit functions for the three firms are:
π1 = (pA − c)qA1 + (pB − c)qB1 , (6)
π2 = (pB − c)qB2 , (7)
π3 = (pA − c)qA3 . (8)
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From profit maximization, equilibrium quantity levels are:6
q∗A1 = q
∗
B1 =
a− c
3 + 4θ + θ2
, (9)
q∗B2 = q
∗
A3 =
a− c
3 + θ
. (10)
while equilibrium profits are:
π∗1 =
2(a− c)2
(1 + θ)(3 + θ)2
, π∗i =
(a− c)2
(3 + θ)2
, i = 2, 3. (11)
Suppose now that firm 1 decides to bundle its products: in particular, it ties
α ≥ 1 units of good A to each unit of good B. Using a slightly different notation than
Martin’s, firm 1 offers the bundle qAB1 ≡ (α, 1), while now firm 2 and 3 respectively
offer "fictitious" bundles qB2 ≡ (0, 1) and qA3 ≡ (1, 0). The choice of α is endogenous
and the timing of the game can be described as follows: in the preliminary stage
firm 1 selects the amount α, then it decides whether to bundle or not; the final stage
is the Cournot game.
Under bundling, the overall quantity of both goods sold in the market is:
QA = αqAB1 + qA3 , (12)
QB = qAB1 + qB2 . (13)
We can derive the demand structure for bundles by substituting Eqs. (12) and
(13) into (1), which becomes
U = m+ a[qAB1(1 + α) + qA3 + qB2] + (14)
−1
2
[
(qAB1 + qB2)
2 + 2θ(qB2 + qAB1)(qA3 + αqAB1) + (qA3 + αqAB1)
2
]
Inverse demand functions can be easily computed and are:
pAB1 = a(1 + α)− (1 + 2αθ + α2)qAB1 − (1 + αθ)qB2 − (α+ θ)qA3 , (15)
pB2 = a− qB2 − (1 + αθ)qAB1 − θqA3, (16)
pA3 = a− qA3 − (α+ θ)qAB1 − θqB2 . (17)
Profit functions with bundling write:
bπ1 = [pAB1 − (1 + α)c] qAB1, (18)
bπ2 = (pB2 − c)qB2 , (19)
bπ3 = (pA3 − c)qA3 , (20)
6Second-order conditions and stabilty conditions are always met, as one can easily check.
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where additional subscript b indicates bundling.
Profit maximization leads to optimal bundles as a function of α:
qAB1(α) =
(a− c)(2− θ)(1 + α)[
αθ(5− θ2) + (3− θ2)(1 + α2)] , (21)
qB2(α) =
(a− c)(2− θ − α+ 5αθ − 2αθ2 + 3α2 − 2α2θ)[
αθ(5− θ2) + (3− θ2)(1 + α2)] , (22)
qA3(α) =
(a− c) [3− α− 2αθ2 + 2α2 − θ(2− 5α+ α2)][
αθ(5− θ2) + (3− θ2)(1 + α2)] . (23)
Second order conditions are always met; moreover, one can easily demonstrate
that the above equilibrium quantities are always positive.
Firm 1’s profit as a function of α becomes:
bπ1(α) =
(a− c)2(2− θ)2(1 + α)2(1 + 2αθ + α2)
4
[
3− θ2 + αθ(5− θ2) + α2(3− θ2)]2 , (24)
while the profit functions of firms 2 and 3 are:
bπ2(α) =
(a− c)2 [θ + α− 2− αθ(5− 2θ)− α2(3− 2θ)]2
4
[
3− θ2 + αθ(5− θ2) + α2(3− θ2)]2 , (25)
bπ3(α) =
(a− c)2 [2θ + α− 3− αθ(5− 2θ)− α2(2− θ)]2
4
[
3− θ2 + αθ(5− θ2) + α2(3− θ2)]2 . (26)
Focusing on bπ1(α), it possible to find three different values of α which maximize
(24); however, the only admissible one is α = 1.7 It follows that the equilibrium
profit functions in case of bundling are:
bπ
∗
1 =
2(a− c)2
(1 + θ)(3 + θ)2
, bπ
∗
i =
(a− c)2
(3 + θ)2
, i = 2, 3. (27)
By comparing (11) with (27) it becomes evident that:
bπ
∗
1 = π
∗
1 =
2(a− c)2
(1 + θ)(3 + θ)2
; (28)
this implies that bundling does not convey any additional gain in terms of profit to
the multi-product firm. I can therefore state the following:
Proposition 1 If one extends the model by Martin (1999) by considering one rival
for each good produced by the multi-product firm, bundling becomes ineffec-
tive.
7Additional calcultions are available upon request.
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As firm 1′s optimal bundle consists of one unit of each good, and since there
are neither ex-ante asymmetries on the marginal costs, nor cost complementarities
induced by selling the two goods in a unique package, bundling is irrelevant in a
scenario where firms compete in quantities. One can observe that, if α = 1, profit
functions (6-8) are equivalent to (18-19) when it comes to profit maximization. In
particular, when taking F.O.C.s and simultaneously solving, the resulting equilib-
rium quantities are exactly the same, as one can verify by plugging α = 1 into
(21-23). Another serious limitation of Martin’s approach is that it allows to con-
sider only Cournot competition. The demand structure (2-3), while being invertible,
does not allow to derive the profit functions for firms competing in prices when one
considers the presence of more than one firm for each good.
3 The Model: changing the social welfare function
In this section I move to the core of my paper and model the case of a multi-product
firm that produces two complement goods and competes with single-product firms
each producing a horizontally differentiated versions of the goods.
Multi-product firm 1 produces A1 and B1, which are complements. Firm 2
producesB2, an horizontally differentiated version with respect to B1, whereas firm 3
produces A3, an horizontally differentiated version with respect to A1. The consumer
is free to buy whatever amount of the four goods; they do not have to be consumed
together, nor in fixed amounts; moreover, the joint consumption of A1 and B1 does
not represent a higher quality variant with respect to every other combination of A
and B. As the level of the demand intercept a has no effect on relative prices and
quantities, I normalize a = 1.
The social welfare function that represents such consumer preferences takes the
following form:
U = m+ (qA1 + qB1 + qA3 + qB2)−
1
2
(q2A1 + q
2
B1 + q
2
A3 + q
2
A3) + (29)
−(δqA1qB1 + δqA1qB2 + γqA1qA3 + γqB1qB2 + δqB1qA3 + δqB2qA3),
where m is the amount of the numeraire good, whose price is normalized to 1,
qA1 and qA3 (resp. qB1 and qB2) are the quantities of good A (resp. B) produced
by firm 1 and 3 (resp. 1 and 2). Parameter δ ∈ (−1, 0) measures the degree of
complementarity between each combination of A and B, while γ ∈ (0, 1) measures
product substitutability both between A1 and A3 and between B1 and B2. This is
consistent with the general framework that I want to investigate.
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The implied inverse demand functions for the four goods are:8
pA1 = 1− qA1 − δ(qB1 + qB2)− γqA3 , (30)
pB1 = 1− qB1 − δ(qA1 + qA3)− γqB2 , (31)
pB2 = 1− qB2 − δ(qA1 + qA3)− γqB1 , (32)
pA3 = 1− qA3 − δ(qB1 + qB2)− γqA1 . (33)
The above demand system can be inverted and direct demand functions are given
by:
qA1 =
(1 + γ) [1 + γ(pA3 − 1)− pA1 ] + (1− γ)δ(pB1 + pB2 − 2) + 2δ2(pA1 − pA3)
(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)(1 + γ − 2δ) ,
(34)
qB1 =
(1 + γ) [1 + γ(pB2 − 1)− pB1] + (1− γ)δ(pA1 + pA3 − 2) + 2δ2(pB1 − pB2)
(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)(1 + γ − 2δ) ,
(35)
qB2 =
(1 + γ) [1 + γ(pB1 − 1)− pB2] + (1− γ)δ(pA1 + pA3 − 2) + 2δ2(pB2 − pB1)
(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)(1 + γ − 2δ) ,
(36)
qA3 =
(1 + γ) [1 + γ(pA1 − 1)− pA3 ] + (1− γ)δ(pB1 + pB2 − 2) + 2δ2(pA3 − pA1)
(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)(1 + γ − 2δ) .
(37)
As in previous contributions, I assume that: (i) the two goods are independent
in production and there are no cost complementarities for the firm producing both
goods; (ii) the unitary cost of producing one unit of each good is symmetric across
firms and equal to c. Without loss of generality, constant unit production costs are
set equal to zero, i.e. c = 0.
Profit functions can be written as:
π1 = pA1qA1 + pB1qB1 , (38)
π2 = pB2qB2 , (39)
π3 = pA3qA3. (40)
Differently from the demand structure adopted by Martin (1999), I can write profit
functions and then compute equilibrium profits both under Cournot and Bertrand
competition. They will serve as benchmark cases against which to evaluate the
profitability of bundling in both regimes. I limit my investigation to the case of
pure bundling, given the complexity of the above demand structure. As usual, the
decision of the multi-product firm on whether to bundle or not is assumed to take
place before the market stage.
8A similar demand structure can be found in Choi (2008) and Economides and Salop (1992).
However, both papers consider four composite products which are substitutes for one another.
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4 Cournot Competition
In this section I compute equilibrium quantities and profits when firms compete in
quantities, first in the absence of bundling and then when firm 1 decides to sell its
products A1 and B1 in a unique package.
4.1 No Bundling
When the multi-product firm does not resort to bundling, profit functions are simply
obtained by substituting inverse demand functions (30-33) into (38-40). The mar-
ket equilibrium when firms compete in quantities is characterized by the following
F.O.C.s:
∂π1
∂qA1
= 0,
∂π1
∂qB1
= 0,
∂π2
∂qB2
= 0,
∂π3
∂qA3
= 0. (41)
Equilibrium quantities are given by:9
qCA1 = q
C
B1 =
(2− γ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)] , (42)
qCB2 = q
C
A3 =
(2− γ + δ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)] , (43)
where superscript C indicates the Cournot case.
When evaluating the non-negativity of equilibrium quantities, it appears that:
Lemma 1 Equilibrium quantities under Cournot competition are positive iff: (i)
δ ≥ (√5− 3); (ii) δ < (√5− 3) and γ > γ1 = −δ −
√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2).
Proof See the Appendix.
I limit my attention to the interval region where quantities are positive and
assume that the conditions appearing in Lemma 1 are always met. An ancillary
result of Lemma 1 is the exclusion of the very peculiar case of simultaneous perfect
complementarity and perfect substitutability (δ = −1 together with γ = 1). In
particular, when δ = −1, there are no admissible values in γ ∈ (0, 1) that satisfy the
above condition.
By plugging (42) and (43) into demand functions (30-33) and simplifying, equi-
librium prices are:
pCA1 = p
C
B1 =
(2− γ)(1 + δ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)] , (44)
pCA3 = p
C
B3 =
(2− γ + δ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)] (45)
9Second Order Conditions and stability conditions are always met, as it can be easily verified.
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which are positive in the interval region under consideration. It is relatively easy
to demonstrate that qCA1 = q
C
B1
> qCB2 = q
C
A3
and pCA1 = p
C
B1
< pCA3 = p
C
B3
: the
multi-product firm sells more of each product and charges a lower price than the
rivals.
Finally, equilibrium profits in absence of bundling are:
πC1 =
2(2− γ)2(1 + δ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)]2 , (46)
πC2 = π
C
3 =
(2− γ + δ)2
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)]2 . (47)
Obviously, as firm 1 sells both products, πC1 > π
C
2 = π
C
3 ; however, by comparing
the profit of the multi-product firm with the sum of the profits of its rivals, we find
that:
Lemma 2 πC1 > π
C
2 + π
C
3 when γ > γ2 = 1−
√
1 + δ, where γ2 > γ1.
Lemma 2 can be illustrated with the aid of Figure A, where the above threshold
values of γ determine the partition of the parameter space represented in δ ∈ (−1, 0)
and γ ∈ (0, 1). The dashed area in γ ∈ (0, γ1) can be disregarded, following Lemma
1.
Figure A : Profits’ comparison in Cournot competition
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The derivatives of the equilibrium profits w.r.t. γ convey the expected results
that ∂πC1 /∂γ < 0 and ∂(π
C
2 + π
C
3 )/∂γ < 0. However, an increase in the degree
of product substitutability hits less the multi-product firm than the single-product
firms, given that: ∣∣∣∣∂πC1∂γ
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∂(πC2 + πC3 )∂γ
∣∣∣∣ . (48)
This result deserves an additional explanation. It has been already shown that
firm 1 sells a higher amount of its variants of goods A and B and charges a lower
price than the rivals: compared to firms 2 and 3, on each good firm 1 enjoys a
quantity surplus but suffers from a price reduction. Consider the market for good
A, for example: equilibrium prices and quantities are a negative function of product
substitutability, i.e. ∂qCA1/∂γ < 0, ∂q
C
A3
/∂γ < 0, ∂pCA1/∂γ < 0 and ∂p
C
A3
/∂γ < 0.
Moreover: ∣∣∣∣∣∂q
C
A1
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣∂q
C
A3
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣ when γ + δ > 0; (49)∣∣∣∣∣∂p
C
A1
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∣∂p
C
A3
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣ always in our interval region. (50)
The same result obviously holds when considering the market for good B. It follows
that, when product differentiation is relatively low (i.e. γ increases), the quantity
surplus expands and the price loss decreases, thus explaining the higher profit of the
multiproduct firm with respect to the sum of the profits of the two single-product
firms. Finally, notice that ∂γ2/∂δ < 0: the lower the degree of complementarity
between any A and B, the higher the probability to lie in the region γ > γ2.
4.2 Bundling
Consider the situation in which the multi-product firm 1 decides to tie its two
products A1 and B1 in the bundle qAB1 . Following Martin’s (1999), it may offer α
units of B1 for each unit of A1, or viceversa, while firms 2 and 3 respectively continue
to offer goods B2 and A3. Consider the case in which qA1 = qAB1 and qB1 = αqAB1 .
The social welfare function (29) with bundle qAB1 becomes:
U = m+ [qAB1(1 + α) + qA3 + qB2 ]−
1
2
[q2AB1(1 + α) + q
2
A3 + q
2
A3 ] + (51)
− [αδqAB1(qAB1 + qB2) + γqAB1(qA3 + αqB2) + δqA3(αqAB1 + qB2)] .
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The implied inverse demand functions for bundle qAB1 and quantities qB2 and qA3
are:
pAB1 = 1 + α− qAB1(1 + 2αδ + α2)− (γ + δ)qB2 − (αδ + γ)qA3 , (52)
pB2 = 1− qB2 − (αγ + δ)qAB1 − δqA3 , (53)
pA3 = 1− qA3 − (αδ + γ)qAB1 − δqB2 . (54)
Profit functions with bundling in Cournot competition are given by:
bπ1 = pAB1qAB1 = (55)
=
{
1 + α− qAB1(1 + 2αδ + α2)− (γ + δ)qB2 − (αδ + γ)qA3
}
qAB1 ,
bπ2 = pB2qB2 = [1− qB2 − (αγ + δ)qAB1 − δqA3] qB2, (56)
bπ3 = pA3qA3 = [1− qA3 − (αδ + γ)qAB1 − δqB2 ] qA3 (57)
where additional subscript b indicates bundling. Taking F.O.C.s:
∂(bπ1)
∂qAB1
= 0,
∂(bπ2)
∂qB2
= 0,
∂(bπ3)
∂qA3
= 0, (58)
I obtain the following equilibrium quantities as a function of α:
qAB1(α) =
(2− γ)(2− δ)(1 + α)
2
{
4− γ2 − 2δ2 + γδ + αδ [8− (4− γ)δ − δ2]+ (2− γ)(2 + γ − δ2)α2} ,
(59)
qB2(α) =
(2− γ)(2 + γ − 2δ) + α [γ2 + 2(3− δ)δ − γ(2 + δ)]+ α2(2− γ)(2− δ)
2
{
4− γ2 − 2δ2 + γδ + αδ [8− (4− γ)δ − δ2]+ α2(2− γ)(2 + γ − δ2)} ,
(60)
qA3(α) =
(2− γ)(2− δ) + α [γ2 + 2(3− δ)δ − γ(2 + δ)]+)α2(2− γ)(2 + γ − 2δ)
2
{
4− γ2 − 2δ2 + γδ + αδ [8− (4− γ)δ − δ2]+ α2(2− γ)(2 + γ − δ2)} .
(61)
Second order conditions and non-negativity of equilibrium quantities are always met
when Lemma 1 holds.
Firm 1’s profit is given by:
bπ1(α) =
(2− γ)2(2− δ)2(1 + α)2(1 + 2αδ + α2)
4
{
4− γ2 − 2δ2 + γδ + αδ [8− (4− γ)δ − δ2]+ (2− γ)(2 + γ − δ2)α2}2 .
(62)
I omit for brevity the profit functions of B and C and focus on bπ1(α). It is relatively
easy to find three values of α which maximize (62); however, the only admissible
solution is α = 1, as in Section 2.10
10Additional calculations are available upon request.
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Equilibrium profit functions for bundling when α = 1 are:
bπ
C
1 =
2(2− γ)2(1 + δ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)]2 , (63)
bπ
C
i =
(2− γ + δ)2
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)]2 , i = 2, 3. (64)
One can easily notice that the above expressions are exactly equivalent to (46) and
(47). In particular,
bπ
C
1 = π
C
1 =
2(2− γ)2(1 + δ)
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)]2 ; (65)
as a consequence, bundling does not bring any additional profit gain for firm 1. This
implies:
Proposition 2 In a Cournot model with a multi-product firm that produces two
goods and competes with a single-product firm in each market, the strategy
of bundling is ineffective.
Even when the demand structure accounts for the simultaneous presence of com-
plementarity and substitutability relationships across goods, bundling is still irrele-
vant when the multi-product firm competes à la Cournot with single-product rivals
in each segment of the market. The bundle consists of a 1 − 1 ratio and this does
not change consumers’ perception of the degree of substitutability between A1 and
A3 and between B1 and B2, nor that of complementarity between any A and B.
This can be seen by inserting α = 1 in (52-54) and noticing that it represents a
compacted version of (30-33).
Differently from Martin (1999), however, the demand structure developed in
Section 3 is perfectly invertible and it is therefore possible to study what happens
when considering price competition.
5 Bertrand Competition
In this section I consider direct demand (34-37) to compute equilibrium prices, quan-
tities and profits when firms compete à la Bertrand. The first case is the bench-
mark situation in which the multi-product firm does not bundle; in the second case
bundling is selected and the multi-product firm obliges consumers to buy products
A1 and B1 together in a unique package.
5.1 No Bundling
When firm 1 sells its product separately, profit functions can be derived by plug-
ging (34-37) into (38-40). The market equilibrium when firms compete in prices is
characterized by the following F.O.C.s:
∂π1
∂pA1
= 0,
∂π1
∂pB1
= 0,
∂π2
∂pB2
= 0,
∂π3
∂pA3
= 0. (66)
Solving simultaneously the above equations yields equilibrium prices:
p
B
A1 = p
B
B1 =
(1− γ) [2 + γ(3 + γ)− 6δ2]
4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)] , (67)
p
B
B2 = p
B
A3 =
(1− γ)(1 + γ − 2δ)(2 + γ + 3δ)
4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)] (68)
where superscript B indicates the Bertrand case. When evaluating second-order con-
ditions, together with stability conditions and non-negativity of equilibrium prices,
I find that:
Lemma 3 The system is stable and equilibrium prices under Bertrand competition
are positive iff: (i) δ ≥ −1/2; (ii), γ > γ3 = −(2δ + 1) when δ < −1/2.
Proof See the Appendix.
I assume that the conditions appearing in Lemma 3 always hold, thus guaran-
teeing that all participating firms find it best to produce actively in the market.
Equilibrium quantities can be obtained by plugging the above equilibrium prices
into demand functions (34-37) to get:
q
B
A1 = q
B
B1 =
(1 + δ)
[
2 + γ(3 + γ)− 6δ2]
4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)] (1 + γ + 2δ) ,
(69)
q
B
B2 = q
B
A3 =
(2 + γ + 3δ)
(
1 + γ + 2δ2
)
{4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]} (1 + γ + 2δ) .
(70)
They are obviously always positive under the conditions specified in Lemma 3. As
in Cournot case, in each market firm 1 produces more and charges a lower price than
the rivals: qBA1 = q
B
B1
> qBB2 = q
B
A3
and pBA1 = p
B
B1
< pBA3 = p
B
B3
.
Finally, equilibrium profits in absence of bundles are:
πB1 =
2(1− δ)(1 + δ) [2 + γ(3 + γ)− 6δ2]2
{4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]}2 (1 + γ + 2δ) , (71)
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πBi =
(1− γ) (1 + γ − 2δ) (1 + γ − 2δ2)(2 + γ + 3δ)2(1 + γ − 2δ2)
{4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]}2 (1 + γ + 2δ) , i = 2, 3.
(72)
It is to also relatively simple to prove that, when Lemma 3 holds, πB1 > π
B
i . Similarly
to the Cournot case, firm 1’s profit is higher than the sum of its rivals’ profits for
sufficiently high values of product substitutability. In particular:
Lemma 4 πB1 > π
B
2 + π
B
3 when γ > γ4 =
3 + 16δ2 + δ(3− 2Φ) +Φ(Φ− 3)
3Φ
, where
Φ =
[
δ
(
37δ2 − 36δ − 9)+ 3√3√(1 + δ)2 {1 + δ + δ2 [13 + δ(101δ − 18)]}]1/3
and γ4 > γ3 in δ ∈ (−1, 0).
Except for small numerical differences in the threshold values partitioning the
relevant parameter space, both the graphical representation and the intuition behind
the result of Lemma 4 replicate that of Cournot (see Figure A and Lemma 2) and
are therefore omitted for brevity. Yet this confirms that, compared to its rivals, the
multi-product firm is less affected by the negative impact of relatively higher levels
of product substitutability and/or lower levels of product complementarity.
5.2 Bundling
I am now in the position to study the impact of bundling when firms compete in
prices. As under Cournot competition the optimal bundle consisted in a 1− 1 offer,
I consider the easy case where the bundle provided by firm 1 still consists of one
unit of its variety of good A tied with one unit of that of good B. This allows to
avoid unnecessary algebraic complications and to compare the two market regimes
in the simplest way. It follows that qA1 = qB1 = qAB1. The social welfare function
(29) becomes:
U = m+ (2qAB1 + qA3 + qB2)−
1
2
(2q2AB1 + q
2
A3 + q
2
A3) + (73)
− [δqAB1(qAB1 + qB2) + γqAB1(qA3 + qB2) + δqA3(qAB1 + qB2)] ,
and the implied direct demand curves are:
qAB1 =
2(1− γ)− (1 + δ)pAB1 + (γ + δ)(pA3 + pB2)
2(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ) , (74)
qB2 =
1
4
[
4− pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1 + γ + 2δ)
+
pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1− γ) −
2(pA3 − pB2)
(1− δ)
]
, (75)
qA3 =
1
4
[
4− pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1 + γ + 2δ)
+
pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1− γ) −
2(pB2 − pA3)
(1− δ)
]
. (76)
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Profit functions under Bertrand competition and bundling of firm 1 are given
by:
bπ1 = pAB1qAB1 = pAB1
[
2(1− γ)− (1 + δ)pAB1 + (γ + δ)(pA3 + pB2)
2(1− γ)(1 + γ + 2δ)
]
, (77)
bπ2 = pB2qB2 = (78)
=
pB2
4
[
4− pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1 + γ + 2δ)
+
pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1− γ) −
2(pA3 − pB2)
(1− δ)
]
,
bπ3 = pA3qA3 = (79)
=
pA3
4
[
4− pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1 + γ + 2δ)
+
pAB1 − pA3 − pB2
(1− γ) −
2(pB2 − pA3)
(1− δ)
]
.
Solving simultaneously F.O.C.s:
∂(bπ1)
∂pAB1
= 0,
∂(bπ2)
∂pB2
= 0,
∂(bπ3)
∂pA3
= 0 (80)
yields equilibrium prices:
bp
B
AB1 =
(1− γ) [4− γ(γ − 2 + 4δ)− δ(4− 5δ)]
2
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)] , (81)
bp
B
B2 = bp
B
A3 =
(1− γ)(1− δ)(2 + γ + 3δ)
2
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)] . (82)
Second Order Conditions, stability requirements and non-negativity conditions of
equilibrium prices are always met under the parametric restrictions reported in
Lemma 3, as it can be easily ascertained. Moreover, considering (81) vs. (82):
bp
B
B2 = bp
B
A3 < bp
B
AB1 < bp
B
B2 + bp
B
A3 ; (83)
The price charged by firm 1 for its bundle is higher than the price for each single
item produced by rivals 2 and 3, but lower than their sum.
By substituting (81) and (82) into direct demand curves and rearranging:
bq
B
AB1 =
(1 + δ) [4− γ(γ − 2 + 4δ)− δ(4− 5δ)]
4(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)] , (84)
bq
B
B2 = bq
B
A3 =
(2 + γ + 3δ)(
[
2(1 + δ)− (γ + δ)2]
2(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)] . (85)
It is straightforward to verify that in the relevant interval region equilibrium quan-
tities are positive and:
bq
B
B2 = bq
B
A3 < bq
B
b1 < bq
B
B2 + bq
B
A3 ; (86)
Together with (83), this implies that a consumer interested in buying both goods
A and B, and with no strong preference for a specific variety, will find it more
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convenient to buy the bundle proposed by firm 1 than the combination offered by
rivals. However, as there are consumers potentially interested only in one good, or
willing to purchase more than one unit of each good, the quantity of bundles sold
by firm 1 is lower than the sum of separate variants sold by firms 2 and 3.
Finally, plugging (81)-(82) and (84)-(85) in (78), (77) and (79), equilibrium prof-
its under bundling are:
bπ
B
1 =
(1− γ)(1 + δ) [4− γ(γ − 2 + 4δ)− δ(4− 5δ)]2
8(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)]2 , (87)
bπ
B
i =
(1− γ)(1 + δ)(2 + γ + 3δ)2 [2(1 + δ)− (γ + δ)2]
8(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)]2 , i = 2, 3. (88)
Under the restrictions of Lemma 3, bπ
B
1 > bπ
B
i , while bπ
B
1 > bπ
B
2 + bπ
B
3 only when
consumers perceive a high degree of product substitutability.11 This confirms what
already highlighted in Lemma 2 and 4, i.e. that the profit of the multi-product firm
is higher than the individual profit of its rivals, while it is lower than their sum for
sufficiently high values of product differentiation.
Moreover, and of great interest for the purpose of the paper, a careful inspec-
tion at (87)- (88) vis-à-vis (71)- (72) reveals that under Bertrand competition the
bundling strategy does produce a change in the equilibrium profits. It is therefore
possible to evaluate whether the multi-product firm 1 has an incentive to bundle,
and the potential effect on the rivals’ profits. First of all, by comparing (87) with
(71), I can prove that:
Proposition 3 Under Bertrand competition, the multi-product firm opts for bundling
when γ + δ > 0, i.e. when the degree of substitutability between its products
and those produced by the rivals is sufficiently high, and/or when the degree
of product complementarity between any A and B is sufficiently low.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This result is very interesting as it shows that in presence of price competition
bundling affects consumer’s decision even when the multi-product firm ties its prod-
uct on a 1− 1 ratio. The decision about whether to bundle or not depends on the
balance between the degree of product substitutability and the degree of product
11More precisely,
bπ
B
1 > bπ
B
2 + bπ
B
3 when γ >
2+3δ(1−δ)−
√
2{2+δ[3+δ(1+δ+δ2)]}
δ−3
whose graphical representation is indeed similar to γ2 and γ4.
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complementarity characterizing market competition. The derivatives of (87) and
(71) w.r.t. γ and δ confirm that a reduction in the degree of both product differen-
tiation and product complementarity lowers the profit of firm 1: ∂bπ
B
1 /∂γ < 0 and
∂bπ
B
1 /∂δ < 0; ∂π
B
1 /∂γ < 0 and ∂π
B
1 /∂δ < 0. Nonetheless, the multi-product firm 1
can use the bundling strategy to dampen such negative effects, given that:∣∣∣∣∂bπB1∂γ
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∂πB1∂γ
∣∣∣∣ and
∣∣∣∣∂bπB1∂δ
∣∣∣∣ <
∣∣∣∣∂πB1∂δ
∣∣∣∣ . (89)
Bundling acts therefore as (i) a product-differentiation device, when product substi-
tutability between the varieties of A and B produced by firm 1 and those produced
by its rivals increases; (ii) a complementarity-enforcing tool, when the degree of
complementarity between any A and B is low. By forcing consumers to buy A1
and B1 together, the multi-product firm is therefore able to reduce the profit loss
induced by higher levels of both γ and δ.
Indeed, when comparing firm 1’s equilibrium prices and quantities in the two
scenarios, while it obviously always holds that bp
B
AB1
> p
B
A1
= p
B
B1
and bq
B
AB1
>
q
B
A1
= q
B
B1
, it is relatively easy to demonstrate that:
Corollary 1 bp
B
AB1
> p
B
A1
+ p
B
B1
and bq
B
AB1
> q
B
A1
= q
B
B1
when γ + δ > 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
In the parametric region where γ + δ > 0, firm 1 sells more bundles (consisting
of one unit of A1 joint with one unit of B1) than the individual sale of A1 and B1.
Moreover, the price it charges for the bundle is higher than the sum of the prices of
the two unbundled goods. This helps explaining why the multi-product firm opts
for bundling.
It is relevant to investigate what happens to equilibrium prices, quantities and
profits of the rivals when the multi-product firm decides to bundle.
Corollary 2 When the multi-product firm opts for bundling, rivals charge a higher
price and sell a lower quantity than without bundling: bp
B
B2
= bp
B
A3
> pBB2 =
pBA3 and bq
B
B2
= bq
B
A3
< qBB2 = q
B
A3
. Moreover, they gain in terms of profit
only for very high values of product substitutability and/or very low values
of product complementarity. In particular, bπ
B
i > π
B
i when γ > γ5, where
γ5> −δ and ∂γ5/∂δ < 0; in the remaining interval region, firm 2 and 3 incur
in a profit loss.
Proof: See the Appendix.
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As a consequence, not only the bundling firm, but also its two symmetric rivals
are able to raise their price in equilibrium. This is not surprising, as Bertrand’s
reaction functions are upward sloping. However, being single-product, their market
share shrinks. Turning to profit’s evaluation, the above corollary specifies that firms
2 and 3 gain under bundling only when γ > γ5(> −δ), i.e. when the goods that
they produce are perceived by consumers as very similar to those produced by the
multi-product firm 1. This happens because the (positive) price difference overcomes
in absolute value the (negative) quantity difference:
∣∣
bp
B
B2 − pBB2
∣∣ > ∣∣ bqBB2 − qBB2∣∣ , (90)
and similarly for firm 3. In addition, as ∂γ5/∂δ < 0, the lower the product comple-
mentarity, the lower the degree of product substitutability required for the condition
γ > γ5 to hold.
The main results appearing in Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 are represented in
Figure B, where the threshold values of γ partition the parameter space δ ∈ (−1, 0)
and γ ∈ (0, 1) in three areas of interest, given that the dashed area in γ ∈ (0, γ3)
has no economic meaning, following Lemma 3.
Figure B : Bundling vs. No Bundling in Bertrand competition
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In γ ∈ (γ3,−δ) bundling is not selected at equilibrium by firm 1 as γ < −δ. On
the contrary, in the north-east parametric semi-space where γ > −δ, firm 1 opts
for bundling and the rivals enjoy a higher profit than without bundling only when
γ ∈ (γ5, 1), while in γ ∈ (−δ, γ5) their profit are lower.
These results are in line with Denicolò (2000), who shows that: (i) pure bundling
can be profitable for the multiproduct/generalist firm when product substitutability
across components increases and that (ii) the specialist/single-product firm may
lose under bundling. However, in my model I can represent the situation in which
the two goods do not have to be combined together for a ‘system’ to function;
additionally, using my approach it is possible to capture the interaction between
product substitutability and product complementarity in driving the decision to
bundle for the multi-product firm.
5.3 Welfare implications
Compared to the situation where bundling was absent, the price per bundle charged
by the multi-product firm is higher than the sum of the prices of the two unbundled
goods, but the total amount of goods sold in the market increases. Rivals increase
their prices as well, but their output shrinks. The impact for consumer surplus
deserves therefore additional scrutiny.
First of all, consumer surplus for the Bertrand case in absence of bundling can
be obtained from (29) and amounts to:
CSB =
(1 + δ) · Γ
(1 + γ + 2δ) {4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]}2 , (91)
where
Γ = 2(1 + γ)2(2 + γ)2 + 6(1 + γ)2(2 + γ)δ − 3(1 + γ)(13 + γ(10 + γ)δ2 +
−2δ3 [29 + γ(38 + 5γ)] + 24δ4(2 + γ) + 72δ5.
On the other hand, when firm 1 opts for bundling, consumer surplus derives from
(73) and is given by:
bCS
B =
(1 + δ)
16(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)]2 ·∆ (92)
where:
∆ = 32 + 3γ5 + γ4(1 + 24δ) + 2γ2 {δ [δ(56δ − 27)− 52]− 8}+ γ3(74δ2 − 20− 8δ) +
+δ {112 + δ(76 + δ [δ(32δ − 55)− 80]}+ γ [32− δ(2− δ)(87δ2 + 78δ − 4)] .
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It is relatively easy to demonstrate that CSB > 0 and bCS
B > 0 in the interval
region under consideration, as both the values of Γ and ∆ are positive in γ ∈ (γ3, 1),
as well as (1 + γ + 2δ). Finally, by comparing (91) with (92), one can find that:
Lemma 5 In the relevant interest region γ ∈ (γ3, 1), consumers always lose when
firm 1 decides to bundle, as bCS
B < CSB.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The above lemma highlights the detrimental effect of the bundling activity on
consumer surplus, mainly due to the surge of prices. An antitrust authority focusing
exclusively on consumer protection should therefore intervene when it detects the
strategy adopted by the multi-product firm to sell both goods in a unique package.
However, the results of the previous subsection indicate that the multi-product
firm can reduce the profit loss induced by higher levels of product substitutability
and/or lower levels of product complementarity by resorting to bundling. In addi-
tion, there exists an interval region where also the rivals gain in terms of profits. It
follows that the potential effect of bundling on social welfare, defined as the sum of
consumer surplus and firms’ profits, is at least ambiguous.
The total welfare in the two cases is respectively given by:
SWB = CSB + πB1 + π
B
2 + π
B
3 , (93)
bSW
B = bCS
B + bπ
B
1 + bπ
B
2 + bπ
B
3 , (94)
whose complete expressions are reported in the Appendix. An analytical evaluation
of the difference between social welfare with and without bundling reveals that:
Proposition 4 In the relevant interest region, bundling always reduces social wel-
fare, as bSW
B < SWB in γ ∈ (γ3, 1).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Now the result leaves no room for doubt, at least for the theoretical framework
described in my model. A policy maker should therefore prohibit the use of the
bundling strategy adopted by a multi-product firm looking for shelter under the
unfavorable circumstance of low product differentiation and scarce product comple-
mentarity. This sheds light on a partially neglected case for antitrust intervention:
at a first sight, one may think that it is not worthy to investigate the situation in
which the multi-product firm decides to bundle A1 with B1 when rivals provide very
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similar of both A and B. A consumer particularly interested in buying only the good
of type A may simply resort to firm 3 and get A3, whose characteristics are very
similar to those of A1. However, and this is the crucial point, as bundling increases
both the price of the bundle and that of A3, the consumer will face a significant
drop in his surplus. In aggregate, moreover, this brings to an overall reduction of
total welfare.
6 Conclusions and extensions
This paper analyzed the effect of bundling by a multi-product firm that produces
two complement goods and competes with single-product firms each producing a
differentiated version of its products. The two complement goods do not have to be
consumed together and the combination of those produced by the multi-product firm
does not yield a higher quality with respect to the combination of those produced
by the rivals. The aim was to show the strategic effect of bundling in a scenario in
which the only asymmetry is the number of goods produced by the multi-product
firm.
I started by expanding the contribution by Martin (1999) to prove that in his
context bundling is ineffective when one introduces competition on both markets
served by the multi-product firm. Another limitation of Martin’s model is that it
allows to consider only Cournot competition, while I wanted to investigate the effect
of bundling also under Bertrand competition. For these reasons, I had to introduce
a specific social welfare function; then I computed the equilibrium profits under
both competition regimes and evaluated the incentive for the multi-product firm to
bundle its products.
Under quantity competition, I demonstrated that the multi-product firm reacts
better than rivals in front of lower levels of product differentiation. However, it does
not earn additional profits by selling the two goods in a package. The situation is
different under price competition, as bundling becomes profitable for sufficiently high
levels of product substitutability combined with a relatively low degree of product
complementarity. As profits in general suffer from a decrease in both the level of
product differentiation and that of product complementarity, the multi-product firm
can resort to bundling to reduce such a drop in profits. As for the rivals, they also
may experience a positive impact on profits when the multi-product firm bundles,
but this happens only for very high values of product substitutability combined with
very low values of product complementarity, otherwise they incur in a profit loss.
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One of the consequences of the bundling strategy adopted by the multi-product
firm is that not only its prices, but also those charged by the rivals increased, thus
reducing consumer surplus and calling for the intervention of the regulator. When
evaluating social welfare, I showed that the loss in consumer surplus is higher than
the overall gain for firms, thus justifying the intervention of the antitrust agency
when bundling is detected. It is worth noting that in my model bundling has a
negative effect on welfare even in absence of entry-deterrence considerations. As
a further research on the field, it would be interesting to study the role played by
bundling as a barrier to entry when single product firms have to pay an entry cost
when entering a market dominated by the multi-product firm.
The model presented can also be expanded in other directions. First of all,
one can think of two multi-product firms competing in the same markets and study
their incentive to bundle, and the consequences for social welfare. Second, one might
introduce asymmetries in the degree of substitutability between different varieties
of the same good and/or complementarity between complements goods. However,
this could lead to a significant complication of the algebraic expressions of the model
and probably not result in analytical solutions.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the common denominator of equilibrium quantities (42) and (43):
[4− γ(γ − 2δ) + δ(6 + δ)] > 0 (A1)
when γ ∈ (−δ −
√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2),−δ +
√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2)).
However, the bigger root lies outside the parameter interval γ ∈ (0, 1) given that
−δ +
√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2) > 1 in δ ∈ (−1, 0). On the contrary, the smaller root (−δ −√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2) ∈ (0, 1) when δ < √5 − 3, otherwise it is always negative. As a
consequence, taking into account that γ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (−1, 0), the denominator
is positive when:
(i) δ ≥ (
√
5− 3); (A2)
(ii) γ > −δ −
√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2) when δ < (
√
5− 3)
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As for the numerator of (42) and (43):
(2− γ) > 0 always in γ ∈ (0, 1) (A3)
(2− γ + δ) > 0 always in γ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (−1, 0)
Notice that (2 − γ + δ) > 0 requires that the very peculiar case where γ = 1 and
δ = −1 has to be disregarded. It follows that the equilibrium quantities when
firms play the Cournot game in absence of bundling are positive when the common
denominator is positive, i.e. always when (A2) holds and γ ∈ (0, 1) and δ ∈ (−1, 0).
For notational purposes: γ1 = −δ −
√
2(2 + 3δ + δ2). 
Proof of Lemma 3
Second-order conditions are negative iff
(1 + γ − 2δ2)
(1 + γ + 2δ)
> 0⇐⇒ (A4)
⇐⇒


(i) γ ∈ (0, 2δ2 − 1) ∪ γ ∈ (−2δ − 1, 1) when δ ∈ (−1,−√2/2);
(ii) γ ∈ (−2δ − 1, 1) when δ ∈ (−√2/2,−1/2);
(iii) always when δ ∈ (−1/2, 0).
where −2δ−1 > 2δ2−1 in δ ∈ (−1, 0). Furthermore, global stability for the system
entails the evaluation of the 4×4 Hessian matrix, which is negative definite when its
principal minors alternate in sign. It can be demonstrated that this happens only
when γ ∈ (−2δ−1, 1); it follows that the interval region γ ∈ (0, 2δ2−1) appearing in
case (i) does not provide globally stable solutions. Additionally, equilibrium prices
(67) and (68) are positive only when γ ∈ (−2δ − 1, 1), whereas they would take
a negative value in γ ∈ (0, 2δ2 − 1). Stability conditions and non-negativity of
equilibrium prices indicate therefore to limit the parametric region of interest to the
interval γ ∈ (γ3, 1),where γ3 = −2δ − 1.12 
Proof of Proposition 3
By comparing (87) with (71) and rearranging, it results that:
bπ
B
1 − πB1 ∝ (γ + δ)(1 + γ + 2δ)(2 + γ + 3δ) · χ (A5)
12Additional calculations are available upon request. However, as they imply algebraic expressions
which have been evaluated through Mathematica, I decided not to write their explicit expression
in the text.
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Figure 1: Value of χ in δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1)
where:
χ = 32 + γ
[
48 + γ2(γ2 − 5γ − 22)]+ 48δ − 2γδ(4− γ) [2γ(1 + γ)− 5] +
+2δ2 [γ(15γ − 13)− 56]− 2δ3 [γ(9γ − 34) + 79] + δ4(55− γ) + 54δ5.
Under Lemma 3, i.e. in γ ∈ (γ3, 1) , (1 + γ + 2δ) > 0 and (2 + γ + 3δ) > 0;
moreover, χ > 0 in the relevant parameter region, as it can be seen in Figure 1. As
a consequence, bπ
B
b1
> πB1 when (γ + δ) > 0, or γ > −δ. 
Proof of Corollary 1
Take into account (81) vs. (67) and (84) vs. (69):
bp
B
AB1 − (p
B
A1 + p
B
B1) ∝ (γ + δ)(1 + γ + 2δ)(2 + γ + 3δ). (A6)
bq
B
AB1 − q
B
A1 = bq
B
AB1 − q
B
B1 ∝ (γ + δ)(2 + γ + 3δ). (A7)
As noticed above, in γ ∈ (γ3, 1) , (1 + γ + 2δ) > 0 and (2 + γ + 3δ) > 0. It follows
that bp
B
AB1
> (p
B
A1
+ p
B
B1
) and bq
B
AB1
> q
B
A1
when (γ + δ) > 0, or γ > −δ. 
Proof of Corollary 2
Consider (82) vs. (68) and (85) vs. (70). It is relatively simple to find that:
bp
B
B2 − pBB2 = bpBA3 − pBA3 ∝ (1 + γ + 2δ)(2 + γ + 3δ), (A8)
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which is always positive in the region of interest, as already discussed, while
bq
B
B2 − qBB2 = bqBA3 − qBA3 ∝ (2 + γ + 3δ) [γ(γ + 2δ)− 2− δ(4 + δ)] , (A9)
where [γ(γ + 2δ)− 2− δ(4 + δ)] < 0 in γ ∈ (γ3, 1). It follows that, under the
conditions introduced in Lemma 3, bp
B
B2
= bp
B
A3
> pBB2 = p
B
A3
and bq
B
B2
= bq
B
A3
<
qBB2 = q
B
A3
.
The comparison between (88) and (72) appear as more cumbersome than the
previous ones as:
bπ
B
i − πBi ∝ −γ4(1− s) + 2γ2 [1− δ(2 + 3δ)] + 4γδ
[
δ(5δ + 10δ2 − 2)− 1]+
+δ
[
8 + 6δ + δ2(δ2 − 7δ − 16)] , i = 2, 3 (A10)
However, it is possible to find a threshold value of γ such that:
bπ
B
i > π
B
i when γ > γ5. (A11)
The precise expression of γ5 is omitted for brevity but it is represented in Figure
B.13 Numerical and graphical simulations confirm that γ5 ∈ (−δ, 1), i.e. it belongs
to the area where bundling is selected at equilibrium. Moreover, comparative statics
entail that ∂γ5/∂δ < 0: the higher the value of the parameter inversely measuring
product complementarity, the lower the value of γ necessary to satisfy (A11). This
implies that firms 2 and 3 gain from the bundling strategy adopted by firm 1 for a
combination of sufficiently high value of γ and δ. 
Proof of Lemma 5
Taking (91) and (92) and then evaluating bCS
B vs. CSB it is possible to obtain
that:
bCS
B −CSB = (1 + δ)
16(1 + γ + 2δ)
· Ξ, (A12)
where Ξ =
∆{4−γ2(1+γ)+δ(2+δ)(1−6δ)+γ[4+δ(4+5δ)]}2−16Γ[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]2
[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]
2
−{4−γ2(1+γ)+δ(2+δ)(1−6δ)+γ[4+δ(4+5δ)]}2
.
In the relevant interval region γ ∈ (γ3, 1), it follows that bCSB − CSB ∝ Ξ.
Figure 2 represents Ξ in δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1), thus revealing that bCSB−CSB <
0. 
13Also in this case the very long and tedious algebraic expressions have been evaluated with
Mathematica and not included in the text, but they are available upon request.
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Figure 2: bCS
B −CSB in δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1)
Proof of Proposition 4
Total welfare in Bertrand without bundling is given by:
SWB = CSB + πB1 + π
B
2 + π
B
3 = (A13)
=
2(1− δ) ·Θ+ (1 + δ) · Γ
(1 + γ + 2δ) {4− γ2(1 + γ) + δ(2 + δ)(1− 6δ) + γ [4 + δ(4 + 5δ)]}2
whereΘ =
{
(1 + δ)
[
2 + γ(3 + γ)− 6δ2]2 + (1 + γ − 2δ) (2 + γ + 3δ)2(1 + γ − 2δ2)}.
When firm 1 is allowed to bundle, total welfare amounts to:
bSW
B = bCS
B + bπ
B
1 + bπ
B
2 + bπ
B
3 = (A14)
=
(1 + δ) [2(1− γ)Υ +∆]
16(1 + γ + 2δ)
[
2− γ(γ + 2δ) + δ(3− δ − δ2)]2
whereΥ =
{
[4− γ(γ − 2 + 4δ)− δ(4− 5δ)]2 + 2(2 + γ + 3δ)2 [2(1 + δ)− (γ + δ)2]} .
Both SWB and bSW
B are positive in the interval region under consideration as they
consist of the sum of positive components. Taking the difference:
bSW
B − SWB = 1
16(1 + γ + 2δ)
· Ω (A15)
and considering γ ∈ (γ3, 1), it becomes evident that bSWB < SWB ∝ Ω, where:
Ω =
(1+δ)[2(1−γ)Υ+∆]{4−γ2(1+γ)+δ(2+δ)(1−6δ)+γ[4+δ(4+5δ)]}2−16[2(1−δ)·Θ+(1+δ)·Γ][2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]2
[2−γ(γ+2δ)+δ(3−δ−δ2)]
2
−{4−γ2(1+γ)+δ(2+δ)(1−6δ)+γ[4+δ(4+5δ)]}2
.
Figure 3 shows that Ω < 0 in δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1). A fortiori, this will hold
also in the interval region of interest, thus demonstrating that bSW
B < SWB < 0.

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Figure 3: bSW
B − SWB in δ ∈ (−1, 0) and γ ∈ (0, 1)
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